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Abstract
We investigate theoretically and empirically the determinants of second-degree price
discrimination in two-sided markets. We build a model in which a newspaper must at-
tract both readers and advertisers. Readers are uncertain as to their future benefit from
reading, and heterogeneous in their taste for reading. Advertisers are heterogeneous in
their outside option, taste for subscribers, and taste for occasional buyers. To estimate
empirically the effect of the advertisers’ side of the industry on price discrimination on
the readers’ side, we use a “quasi-natural experiment”. We exploit the introduction of
advertisement on French Television in 1968, which we treat as a negative shock on ad-
vertisement revenues of daily national newspapers (treated group), but not on daily local
newspapers (control group). We build a new dataset on French local newspapers be-
tween 1960 and 1974 and perform a Differences-in-Differences analysis. We find robust
evidence of increased price discrimination as a result of a drop in advertising revenues.
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1 Introduction
The newspaper industry is a canonical example of a two-sided market: newspapers serve
two distinct groups of consumers – readers and advertisers, where each group cares about
the presence and characteristics of the other. The resulting network effects lead to subtle
pricing policies that have received much attention recently (see for instance Rochet and Tirole
(2003) and Weyl (2010)). One feature of newspapers’ pricing policies is the observed price
discrimination between subscribers and occasional buyers; subscribers are typically charged
a lower per issue price than occasional buyers, and these price differences appear not to
be explained by cost differences entirely. Furthermore, this difference in prices has recently
increased and newspapers tend now to favor a more subscriber-based readership; a tendency
which is often interpreted as a response to the industry’s state of distress, itself in part
attributed to the continuing drop in adverting revenues. In the United States for example,
we indeed observe a decline in newspaper advertising revenues (as a share of GDP) since the
second half of the 1950’s, decline that has been sharper since the beginning of the 2000’s
(Figure 11).
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Notes: This Figure represents the evolution of newspaper advertising revenues as a share of GDP in the United States
between 1950 and 2013. Data on newspaper revenues is from the Newspaper Association of America (NAA). GDP data
is from the World Development Indicators (WDI).
Figure 1: Newspaper advertising revenues as a share of GDP in the United States, 1950-2103
In this paper we investigate how the reliance on advertising revenues interacts with the
incentives newspapers have to adopt subscriber-based readerships. To this end, we first ex-
tend recent models of multi-sided industries to incorporate the scope for second-degree price
discrimination between subscribers and occasional buyers and, second, we carry out an em-
1Figure C.1 in the online Appendix represents the evolution of newspaper advertising revenues in the United
States over the same period in billion dollars.
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pirical analysis using a new dataset on the French local newspaper industry that we build
from archives data.
We build a general model of a two-sided market in which a monopolist newspaper repeat-
edly interacts with a continuum of readers and a continuum of advertisers. Newspapers can
be purchased by readers either by subscription or at the newsstand on a day-by-day basis.
Independently of the presence of advertisers, the scope for price discrimination stems from
(i) the readers’ uncertainty regarding their exact willingness to pay in future periods and (ii)
the readers’ heterogeneity in their average willingness to pay. Readers with a high average
willingness to pay subscribe at a low per unit price, while others buy the newspaper at a high
price whenever their willingness to pay is high.2
Advertisers are heterogenous in (i) their taste for subscribers, (ii) their taste for occa-
sional readers, and (iii) their outside option (i.e., their payoff when placing ads on alternative
platforms). The challenge is to disentangle how the presence of advertisers affects the prices
charged to readers. We characterize the optimal pricing formulas of the newspaper, as well
as the readers and advertisers’ demands. These formulas are intuitive and in the spirit of
Weyl (2010). When choosing its prices, aside from taking into account the various marginal
costs and demand elasticities, the newspaper must cater to (i) the average taste of marginal
readers – those indifferent between subscribing or buying occasionally on the one hand, and
those indifferent between buying occasionally or never on the other – and (ii) the average
taste of marginal advertisers for both subscribers and non subscribers, as well as their outside
options.
We also aim at providing some comparative statics. We are particularly interested in the
impact on the extent of price discrimination of an increase in the outside option of advertisers.
In a simplified model we show that such a shock leads to an increase in the prices charged
to readers. Indeed, since less surplus may be extracted from advertisers – and assuming that
advertisers prefer more eyeballs to less – the newspaper will cater less to the advertisers’
taste for large readerships and instead increase its margin on the readers’ side (as empirically
observed in Seamans and Zhu (2012)). On the other hand, whether the newspaper moves
towards a more subscriber-based readership is a priori unclear as it depends also on the
average profile of the newly relevant marginal advertisers (and in particular their average
taste for subscribers versus non subscribers).
On the empirical side, the main empirical challenge is to isolate the “advertising revenue”
effect on price discrimination. To this end, we follow an empirical strategy in the spirit of an
event study. We exploit the introduction of advertisement on French Television in October
1968 by treating it as an exogenous negative shock on the advertising side of newspapers.
2This rationale for price discrimination was first introduced by Glazer and Hassin (1982), but in a model
without advertisers.
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Television is state-owned in France from 1945 to 1981. The introduction of advertisement
on television was decided by law, despite strong resistances by the newspaper industry. This
introduction leads to an exogenous shock that shifts exclusively the incentives to price dis-
criminate stemming from advertising revenues. Indeed, reader heterogeneity and the various
marginal costs of producing and delivering newspapers are not affected. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to use this “quasi-natural” experiment.3
Our identifying assumption is that the negative shock on advertising revenues has affected
national daily newspapers, but not local daily newspapers. Indeed, while national newspaper
advertisement consists mostly of commercial advertisements that are relatively close substi-
tutes to those broadcasted on television (national brands, etc), a large share of advertisements
in local newspapers is instead local in nature (local commercial advertisements and classified
advertisements). We document a substitution effect of advertisements from national (but not
local) newspapers to television by studying the actual content of the advertisements broad-
casted on television and of the advertisements published in newspapers before and after the
introduction of advertisement on TV.
We thus use national newspapers as our “treated group”, and local newspapers as our
“control group”. Using novel annual data on local and national newspapers between 1960
and 1974, we compare the pre-1968-to-post-1968 change in price discrimination by national
daily newspapers to the change in price discrimination by local daily newspapers over the
same period (Difference-in-Difference estimation). We find that the decrease in advertising
revenues leads to an increase in the extent of price discrimination, i.e., newspapers adopt a
more subscriber-based readership as a consequence to the drop in advertising revenues. Our
results are robust to a range of alternative specifications and controls. In particular, they are
robust to controlling for industry-specific time trends, and to allowing for flexible time-varying
effects of the negative shock on advertisement revenues (Laporte and Windmeijer, 2005).
Literature review This paper first contributes to the empirical literature that examines
the determinants of price discrimination. A growing number of papers investigate the role of
competition. Seminal contributions include Borenstein (1991) on retail gasoline markets and
Borenstein and Rose (1994) on airline tickets. More recent articles include Busse and Rysman
(2005) who investigate pricing in Yellow pages advertising, Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) who
reexamine air ticket price discrimination, Dai et al. (2012) who study the non-monotonicity
of the effect of competition on price discrimination using data from the U.S. airline, and Seim
and Viard (2011) who study nonlinear pricing in cellular telecommunication markets. All
theses articles study one-sided markets, while ours aims at understanding the consequences
3Filistrucchi et al. (2012) considers the “reverse” experiment: they analyze the effects of the advertising
ban on French public television in 2009. They find that it did not favour private TV channels at the expense
of public ones. They do not investigate how it affects newspapers nor price discrimination, however.
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of network effects on price discrimination.
There also exists a very recent vein of research that examines the role of consumers’
bounded rationality on price discrimination via subscription (see Grubb (2012) for an in-
sightful review). Prominent contributions to this literature are DellaVigna and Malmendier
(2004) for contracts in health sport centers and Grubb (2009) for cellular phone service plans.
Although we recognize that bounded rationality may play a role in consumers’ decision as
to subscribe or not to a newspaper, the scope for price discrimination in our model instead
stems from informational considerations. In addition, our aggregated data do not allow us to
investigate this issue. Finally Clerides (2004) discusses the definition of price discrimination
when products are differentiated. This is of particular importance to us. Indeed, we are
considering here identical newspapers but whose cost of production – through the cost of de-
livery – can vary depending on whether the reader is a unit buyer buying in a newsstand or a
subscriber. We show that at least part of the price differences we observe cannot be explained
by delivery cost differences. Our paper builds more specifically on Glazer and Hassin (1982)
who first study price discrimination by a newspapers based on consumers uncertainty. We
introduce the advertising side in the profit function of the newspapers and discuss how this
aspect modifies prices on the reader side.
Our paper also relates to the literature on two-sided markets. Rochet and Tirole (2003)
provide a widely applicable model of two-sided markets and discuss markets for advertising,
credit cards, software and web portal usage. Weyl (2010) and White and Weyl (2010) further
extend two-sided market models.4 Naturally, much work on two-sided markets has focused on
the media industry. Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) develop an analysis to estimate market
power in the Italian newspaper industry, but do not consider price discrimination. Seamans
and Zhu (2012) look at the impact of the entry of Craig’s list on local newspapers’ pricing
policies and they find that this negative shock on the advertisement side of newspapers had
led to an increase in subscription prices. We contribute to this recent line of research by
introducing price discrimination on one side of the market. To the best of our knowledge, Liu
and Serfes (2010) is the only paper investigating price discrimination in two-sided markets.
However, their modeling approach does not fit well with the newspaper industry as they
consider perfect price discrimination on both sides in a Hotelling framework. Our paper is
the first theoretical and empirical analysis of second-degree price discrimination in a two-sided
market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a model of second-
degree price discrimination by a platform. Section 3 introduces the new dataset we built
4Anderson and Coate (2000) study broadcast markets in which retailers pay for advertising to reach con-
sumers, and where consumers dislike advertising. Rysman (2004) provides an empirical analysis of the market
for yellow pages. Jin and Rysman (2013) study US sports card conventions pricing though the lens of the
two-sided market theory.
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for this study and provides descriptive statistics. In Section 4, we discuss the historical
context of the introduction of advertisement on French Television in 1968, and document a
substitution effect from national newspapers advertisements to advertisements broadcasted
on television. In Section 5 we estimate the effect of the advertising side of newspapers on
price discrimination on the reader side using a Differences-in-Differences analysis based on
the introduction of advertisement on French Television. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Model of Second-Degree Price Discrimination by a Plat-
form
2.1 Set-up
To model the newspaper industry we consider the repeated interaction between a newspaper,
a continuum of readers of mass one (side R of the industry), and a continuum of advertisers
of mass one (side A). In the following we denote S the subgroup of readers subscribing to
the newspaper, and K the subgroup of occasional buyers (where K stands for “Kiosk”). The
newspaper sells n issues during the length of the period of interest, which we take as given.
Newspaper The profit-maximizing newspaper chooses (i) which price p to charge occasional
unit buyers, (ii) which price nh to charge subscribers to have the newspaper delivered to their
home for the n issues and (iii) which price nt to charge advertisers to have their ad be placed
for n issues. The marginal cost of serving unit buyers is denoted cK , that of serving subscribers
is cN , and, finally, that of serving advertisers is cA. We do not model the actual production
of news, and thus implicitly assume that the newspaper produces content that is of interest
to at least some readers.
Readers The gross payoff to reader i from reading the newspaper at date t is given by:
Ui,t = θi + t, (1)
where θi represents an individual specific taste for reading, while t captures a common
shock to all readers at date t (say elections, sport events, etc).5 We assume that θ has support
going from minus infinity to plus infinity, and is drawn according to fR (θ). Furthermore, t
takes value x with probability 12 , and zero otherwise. Reader i, if she has not subscribed,
observes the realization of  before deciding whether to purchase the newspaper at date t.
Not subscribing thus allows readers to make informed purchasing decisions.
5We thus disregard externalities stemming from the presence of advertisements in the newspaper. There is
a line of research investigating whether readers like advertising (see e.g. Kaiser and Song (2009) who use data
on German consumer magazines to analyze the extent to which consumers like advertising). The relationship
between the presence of advertisements and the payoff to reader is inconclusive, however.
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For a given subscription price h per issue (i.e., the actual subscription price is nh), and
prior to observing the n future realizations of , reader i’s expected utility from subscribing
is:
US (θi, h, n) = n
(
θi +
x
2
− h
)
. (2)
The subscriber pays nh upfront to have the n issues delivered at home, and thus read all
n issues (since x > 0 by assumption), where the expected gross benefit per issue is θi +
x
2 .
A reader i’s expected utility from occasionally buying the newspaper at the newsstand
price p per issue is instead given by is:
UK =

n
(
θi +
x
2 − p
)
, if θi ≥ p
n
2 (θi + x− p) , if p > θi ≥ p− x
0, if p− x > θi
(3)
Recall first that non-subscribers make their purchasing decisions at date t knowing the real-
ization of t. Readers that have a very high taste for reading (that is, readers for which θi ≥ p)
always buy the newspaper; their expected gross benefit per issue is thus again θi +
x
2 . Buyers
with instead an intermediary taste for reading (that is, readers for which p > θi ≥ p−x) only
buy the newspaper when the shock t is positive (i.e., when t = x). The expected number of
purchases made by these readers is thus n2 ; and their gross payoff when the shock is positive
is equal to θi +x. Finally, readers with a very low taste for reading never buy the newspaper.
Advertisers We assume that advertisers choose between either placing an ad in the newspa-
per for n periods at price nt or never placing an ad. The gross payoff to advertiser j of placing
an add for n periods is taken to be Vj = nb
S
j N
S + nbKj N
K , where bSj captures advertiser j’s
taste for the average number of subscribers per period NS , while bKj captures his taste for
the average number of non-subscribers per period NK . In addition, advertiser j has outside
option nαvj . The 3-tuple (b
S
j , b
K
j , vj) is drawn according to the joint pdf f
A(bS , bK , v), where
each parameter is drawn from support going from minus infinity to plus infinity. We assume
away any price discrimination by the newspaper on the advertisers’ side of the industry (i.e.,
all advertisers face price nt).
We thus have that advertiser j places an ad in the newspaper for n issues at unit price t
if and only if:
Vj = nb
S
j N
S + nbKj N
K − nt ≥ nαvj . (4)
One can already anticipate that the advertisers’ taste for large readerships may induce
the newspaper to set prices “artificially” low on side R so as to attract many readers (i.e.,
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more than in a world without advertisement) and in turn charge high prices to advertisers. If
prices charged to readers are below the relevant marginal costs, advertisers de facto subsidize
readers. The parameter α captures the supply of alternative platforms to advertisers. These
alternative platforms could be other newspapers (therefore treated in a reduced form) or,
in the spirit of this paper, the television. It is reasonable to think that the introduction of
advertisement on television leads to an increase in α.
2.2 Solving the Model
We first compute the three relevant demand functions; that is, the demand for subscriptions,
the average demand per issue of newspapers at the newsstand, and the demand for advertising
slots.
Readers As long as p > h, when comparing payoffs (3) and (2), one derives that high-
valuation readers subscribe and average ones instead buy occasionally.6 In particular, the
demand by subscribers is equal to:
NS =
∫ ∞
2h−p
fR(θ)dθ. (5)
Rather intuitively, more readers are willing to subscribe to the newspaper when the sub-
scription price nh decreases and/or the unit price p increases. The demand by unit buyers is
instead given by:
NK =
∫ 2h−p
p−x
fR(θ)dθ, (6)
which is decreasing in the unit price p but increasing in the subscription price nh.
Readers with a high taste for reading would buy every issue of the newspaper at the
newsstand at price p (even when t = 0) if subscribing was not possible. Since subscribing is
instead possible, and since h < p, these readers prefer subscribing to enjoy the lower average
price. Readers with an average taste for reading instead have a low-enough gross payoff when
t = 0 that it is not interesting for them to have all n issues be delivered to their home;
they prefer buying it only when t = x, even though the per-issue price p is higher. Here
lies the scope for price discrimination. Setting h < p means extracting less surplus from the
readers with a rather high taste for reading (those who would have bought the newspaper at
the newsstand anyway), but allows the platform to extract more surplus from the informed
consumers; i.e., those who buy only when t = x. It is thus these informational differences
6Observe that it is weakly suboptimal for the newspaper to set p < h (and having no readers subscribe)
since the same outcome can be guaranteed by setting p = h. Furthermore, we implicitly assume that it is in
fact optimal to set p > h. In the simplified model we provide in Subsection 2.3, we provide a condition such
that this is indeed the case.
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that the newspaper exploits through second-degree price discrimination. In other words, it
is not the presence of advertisers that explains the existence of price discrimination in this
model; though advertisers will certainly affect its extent.
Advertisers On the other side of the industry, the demand by advertisers is given by:
NA(NS , NK , t, α) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ 1
α(b
SNS+bKNK−t)
−∞
f(bS , bK , v)dvdbSdbK , . (7)
Advertisers are more willing to place their ads in the newspaper as the average number
of readers increases (both subscribers and non-subscribers), as the price of advertising nt
decreases, and as their outside option decreases. The pricing policy of the newspaper must
thus take into account these network effects when choosing prices on the readers’ side.
The newspaper’s problem Having characterized the relevant demands, the newspaper’s
profits are equal to:
Π = ΠS + ΠK + ΠA (8)
=
n
2
(
p− cK)NK (h, t) + n (h− cS)NS (h, t) + n (t− cA)NA (NS , NK , t, α)
The newspaper chooses h, p, and t to maximize (8). In the following proposition let Sh
denote the elasticity of the subscribers’ demand with respect to the subscription price h, Kh
that of the unit buyers’ demand with respect to the unit price p, etc.
Proposition 1 The optimal pricing policy of the newspaper is characterized by the following
three pricing formulas:
h− cS
h
= − 1
Sh
− 1
2
(
p− ck
) ∂NK
∂h
1
NS
1
Sh
− (t− cA) ∂NA
∂h
1
NS
1
Sh
(9)
p− cK
p
= − 1
Kp
− 2 (h− cS) ∂NS
∂p
1
NK
1
Kp
− 2 (t− cA) ∂NA
∂p
1
NK
1
Kp
(10)
t− cA
t
= − 1
At
. (11)
Proof Differentiating (8) with respect to h yields:
NS +
(
h− cS) ∂NS
∂h
+
1
2
(
p− cK) ∂NK
∂h
+
(
t− cA) ∂NA
∂h
= 0, (12)
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where
∂NA
∂h
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
f
(
bS , bK ,
1
α
(
bSNS + bKNK − t))( 1
α
(
bS
∂NS
∂h
+ bK
∂NK
∂h
))
dbSdbK .
Note that this is nothing else than the average marginal change in payoff of the marginal
advertisers (those exactly indifferent between placing an ad or not). One may rewrite (12) as
follows:
h = cS
Sh
1 + Sh
− 1
2
(
p− cK) Kh
1 + Sh
NK
NS
− (t− cA) Ah
1 + Sh
NA
NS
.
Similarly, differentiating (8) with respect to p and rearranging yields (10), while differen-
tiating (8) with respect to t yields (11). 
Intuition These pricing formulas are Lerner pricing formulas modified to take into account
the scope for price discrimination within readers as well as the presence of advertisers. These
pricing formulas, as well as the three demand functions, help us gain a good intuition for the
newspaper’s prices. In addition to taking into account the various marginal costs and elastic-
ities, the newspaper chooses its prices on the readers’ side taking into account (i) the average
marginal change due to a change in prices charged to readers in the payoff of the marginal
advertisers (those indifferent between placing an ad or not), as well as (ii) the incentives for
non-subscribers to become unit buyers, and finally the incentives for non-subscribers to stop
purchasing altogether. Not surprisingly, we also observe that the relative sizes of each group of
consumers matters as well. Finally, note that the formula for the advertising price is nothing
else but the standard Lerner pricing formula (since externalities from advertising on readers
are for now disregarded).
In addition to this, these formulas also offer us insights directly linked to the empirical
analysis carried out in this paper. Note first that
∂NA
∂h
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
f
(
bS , bK ,
1
α
(
bSNS + bKNK − t))( 1
α
(
bS
∂NS
∂h
+ bK
∂NK
∂h
))
dbSdbK
is equal to the average marginal change in payoff of the marginal advertisers (those exactly
indifferent between placing an ad or not), scaled by the common component of their outside
option. This implies that an increase in the outside option following, say, the introduction of
advertisement on television, affects the extent of price discrimination through a composition
effect, i.e., through a change in the average ”type” of marginal advertisers. The second effect
is, in a sense, less subtle: a change in the outside option of advertisers also changes the price
the newspaper can charge them (it decreases it). Because of this effect, all else equal, the
newspaper will distort less the prices charged to readers. Finally, the magnitude of these two
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effects is affected by the relative sizes of the groups of subscribers and non-subscribers (as
well as the absolute value of their own price elasticity of demand.)
2.3 A Simple Model
The main virtue of the general framework presented in the previous subsection is to identify
the relevant economic factors that determine a newspaper’s pricing policy. To gain further
intuition, and to carry out comparative statics, we however simplify the framework presented
so far in several ways. We first suppose that θi ∼ U
[
0, θ
]
. This implies that the revenues
from subscribers become:
ΠS = nh
(
θ − (2h− p)
θ
)
, (13)
while those from unit purchases are instead given by:
ΠK =
np
2
(
(2h− p)− (p− x)
θ
)
=
np
θ
(
h− p+ x
2
)
. (14)
Next we further simplify the framework by assuming that all advertisers care about is the
average number of readers per issue, i.e., Vj = nN
R, where NR =
θ−(h−x2 )
θ
.
In addition, let the newspaper engage in perfect price discrimination on the advertisers’
side, i.e., let the newspaper choose advertising price ntj for advertiser j.
Advertiser j has outside option αv0,j , where v0,j ∼ U
[
0, V
]
, and thus places an ad if and
only if:
nNR − ntj ≥ nαV0,j . (15)
Again, v0,j captures advertiser j’s payoff on alternative platforms, and α captures the
supply of these alternative platforms. The advertising revenue is thus equal to:
ΠA = n
∫ V
0
max
[
NR − αV0,j , 0
]
dj
= n
(N r)2
2V α
The newspaper therefore chooses p and h to maximize expected payoff:
Π = ΠS + ΠK + ΠA = ns
(
θ − (2h− p)
θ
)
+ np
(
h− p+ x2
θ
)
+ n
(
NR
)2
2V α
. (16)
The following proposition captures the newspaper’s optimal prices.
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Proposition 2 The optimal pricing policy of the newspaper is such that:
t∗j = max
[
NR − αV0,j , 0
]
(17)
h∗ =
1
2
(
θαV − 1) (2θ + x)
2θαV − 1 , (18)
p∗ = h∗ +
x
4
(19)
Proof Differentiating with respect to h and p, and solving the system of two equations,
yields the formulas stated in the proposition.
Not surprisingly, we find that the price charged to occasional readers is higher than that
charged to subscribers. Interestingly, in this simplified model, we find that it is always optimal
for the newspaper to engage in second-degree price discrimination on the readers’ side so long
as x > 0, that is, so long as there is some uncertainty over the taste for reading that can be
exploited. Indeed, recall that it is without loss of generality for the newspaper to set prices
such that p ≥ h since the outcome without subscription can always be replicated by setting
p = h.
Corollary 1 An increase in the common component of the advertisers’ outside options α
leads to an increase in the prices on the readers’ side.
Proof Follows from differentiating the formulas for the prices stated in Proposition 2 with
respect to α. 
Intuition The intuition for this result is as follows. The presence of advertisers whose
payoff increases with the average number of readers leads to the newspaper charging lower
prices to readers that it would choose absent advertisers. If the benefit of doing so is high
enough, readers could even be charged prices below marginal cost (they would then be effec-
tively subsidized). The benefit of doing so to the newspapers naturally comes from the fact
that the created surplus can be then extracted through the price charged to advertisers. Now,
if the advertisers’ outside option increases so that lower prices must be charged, it becomes
less interesting for the newspaper to cater to their taste, and we thus observe a movement in
the prices charged to the readers towards what they would be absent advertising: higher.
3 Industry and Data Characteristics
In this section, we briefly introduce the new dataset we built for this study and describe the
newspaper industry characteristics. We discuss further details of the construction of the data
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in the online Appendix Section B.
3.1 Newspaper Industry Characteristics
The French daily newspaper industry is divided into two sub-industries: the local daily news-
paper industry and the national daily newspaper industry. During our period of interest
(1960-1974), there are around 100 (national and local) general information newspapers.
There are 12 national newspapers at the beginning of the period and 10 at the end.7 The
total national newspaper circulation is stable during this time period, with around 4.2 million
copies sold every day. The number of local newspapers during the same period varies around
90, with a total circulation amounting to around 7.8 million copies (see Cage´ (2014) for more
details on the historical evolution of the French local daily newspapers industry). On average,
the circulation of national daily newspapers amounts to nearly 350,000 copies a day and the
one of local daily newspapers to 100,000. Copies are sold either at the newsstand to unit
buyers or through subscription. The average share of unit buyers is 70%.8 As expected, the
price charged to subscribers is lower than the price paid by unit buyers at the newsstand. The
average price ratio is 0.86. (Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on newspaper prices, rev-
enues and costs as well as on circulation and newspaper content for the entire daily newspaper
industry.9)
Overall, national daily newspapers generate 67.5 million francs (e71.4 million) in total
revenues each year, and local daily newspapers 19.9 million francs (e20.4 million). These
revenues come from sales and from advertising. On average, between 1960 and 1974, the
share of advertising revenues in total revenues is 45%. The quantity of advertisement in
newspapers represents around 2 pages per newspaper issue, i.e., 11% of the content of the
newspaper.
3.2 Data
We collect an annual balanced panel dataset on local and national newspapers in France
between 1960 and 1974. The data is paper data that we digitize and merge from the French
Ministry of Information’s non-publicly available records in the National archives. Newspapers
were asked by the Ministry of Information to report annually on revenues and expenses. We
collect data by having direct access to their responses to these queries.
7Libe´ration and Paris Presse -exit the industry respectively in 1964 and in 1970.
8The statistical discrepancy between the share of unit buyers and the share of subscribers – that do not
sum up to 100 – stems from the fact that a number of copies is distributed for free every day.
9In the online Appendix, we present these descriptive statistics separately for national – Table D.1 – and
local – Table D.2 – daily newspapers.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
mean/sd
Prices
Unit Price 0.44
(0.20)
Subscription Price Per Issue 0.38
(0.17)
Price Ratio 0.86
(0.07)
Revenues and Costs
Total Revenues 26.51
(38.37)
Revenues from Advertising 12.90
(22.03)
Revenues from Sales 13.57
(18.47)
Share of Advertising
in Total Revenues (%) 45
(11)
Total Expenditures 25.67
(38.04)
Profit 0.89
(6.32)
Circulation
Total Circulation 135,332
(178,546)
Share Unit Buyers (%) 70
(23)
Share Subscribers (%) 27
(22)
Content
Total Number of Pages per Issue 16
(7)
Quantity of Advertising per Issue
(in number of pages) 2
(2)
Share of Advertising
in Newspaper Content (%) 11
(7)
Observations 1008
Notes: The Table gives summary statistics. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations and the others
are averages. Time period is 1960-1974. Variables are values for newspapers. Unit price and subscription price
per issue are in francs. Revenues and costs are in million francs.
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Local and national newspapers Our dataset includes data for 61 of the local newspapers,
i.e., more than three quarters of the local daily newspapers industry in 1971. These news-
papers are the only ones for which the data is available in the archives. They represent on
average more than 87% of the total local daily newspaper circulation. Our sample of national
newspapers include all the 10 national newspapers circulating between 1960 and 1974.
Price, cost and revenue data For the 71 newspapers described above we collect data on
prices with information on unit price, subscription price, and the number of issues per year.
This allows us to compute a measure of price discrimination. We also have data on revenues
(from sales and from advertising), and on costs. Finally, we have data on circulation with the
share of unit buyers and the share of subscribers.
Advertising prices and quantity A change in advertising revenues can be driven by
either or both a change in advertising prices or a change in advertising quantity. We collect
data on both the price and the quantity of advertising in order to disentangle the two effects.
A first source of information for advertising prices are the listed prices per advertising slot.
We digitize this data from “Tarif Media”, an annual publication that provides information
regarding advertising prices. However, a downside of using listed prices is that discounts are
common in this industry. Price lists are hence a relevant measure of advertising prices as long
as we assume that the potential bias between list prices and actual prices does not differ too
much across newspapers and over time.
Given this caveat, we propose three other measures of advertising prices. First, we use a
measure of advertising price common in the literature, which consists of the total advertising
revenues divided by the newspaper circulation. Second, we compute an “average” advertising
price by dividing the total advertising revenues by the average amount of advertisements in
each newspaper issue, multiplied by the number of issues. Third, we combine the two previous
approaches and define the advertising price as the total advertising revenues divided by the
average amount of advertisement per issue, multiplied by the number of issues and normalized
by the newspaper circulation.
We collect data on the amount of advertisement per issue directly from the paper ver-
sion of the newspapers available in the French National Library. For each year and each
newspaper, we select two issues (Monday and Thursday of the third week of March10). We
measure the quantity of advertisement on each page. We thus have information on the total
amount of advertisements in the newspaper, and the share of the newspaper that is devoted
to advertising.
10The choice of the third week of March was dictated by the fact that this is the week used by the INSEE
to run all its surveys.
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Finally, for a subset of newspapers, we also collect information on the type of advertise-
ments in the newspapers and obtain information on the category of each advertisement (e.g.
alimentation, automobile, household electrical goods,...) as well as on the brand advertising
in the newspaper.
4 Background on the Introduction of Advertisement on French
Television
The model we built in the previous section provided us with a general framework with which
to think about the determinants of pricing policies by newspapers, including the extent of
price discrimination. In this section, we study empirically how price discrimination varies
with advertising revenues. The empirical strategy we follow is in the spirit of an event study.
We exploit the introduction of advertisement on French Television in October 1968 as an
exogenous negative shock on the advertising side of newspapers. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to use this quasi-natural experiment.
In this section, we first present some historical background on the introduction of advertis-
ing on French Television in 1968, and then document a substitution effect from advertisements
in national newspapers to advertisement on television.
4.1 French Television in 1968
French Television is state-owned from 1945 to 1981.11 A national agency – the “Office de
Radiodiffusion-Te´le´vision Franc¸aise” (ORTF) – is in charge of providing radio and television
content.12 Only one channel (“La premie`re chaˆıne” – the “First Channel”) is available until
1963. A second TV channel (“La deuxie`me chaˆıne” – the “Second Channel”) is introduced in
1964 and a third one (“La troisie`me chaˆıne” – the “Third Channel”) in 1972. TV penetration
is increasing at the time, as shown in Figure 2. In 1970, nearly 70% of the French households
own a television (Parasie, 2010).
Channels are financed mostly through a fee (redevance) until 1968. By law, commercial or
brand advertising is forbidden, with the exception of “collective advertising”. Collective ads
promote products, say fruits, without mention of a brand.13 They were not very important
11During this period all TV channels are privately-owned in the US, while in the UK two TV channels are
state-owned (BBC 1 and BBC 2) and one is private (ITV).
12The first national agency, the “Radiodiffusion Franc¸aise” (RDF), is created in 1945. It is eventually
renamed “Radiodiffusion-Te´le´vision Franc¸aise” (RTF) in 1949 and replaced by the ORTF in 1964.
13These are allowed since the 1950’s and are also referred to as “compensatory advertising” (“publicite´
compense´e”), where the term“compensatory” captures the fact that the ORTF would receive a compensation
in exchange for the broadcast (Duchet, 2005). Not only advertisers have to constitute associations, but an
advertising campaign also needs the approval of the supervisory Ministry (e.g., the Ministry of Agriculture for
oranges).
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Figure 2: TV Penetration in France, 1960-1974
however. In 1959 for example, the time devoted to collective advertising is only of five hours
and ten minutes per year (Parasie, 2010).
The transition to color on the Second Channel and the need to produce an increasing
number of programs means that the ORTF experiences severe financial difficulties – it is “on
the edge of the abyss” (Bellanger, 1969).14 Secretly decided by the French Government in
March 1965, the introduction of advertising on television is made public on October 20th
1967, thereby provoking a strong controversy both in Parliament and within the Newspaper
Industry. The then Prime Minister George Pompidou argues that the ORTF has no choice
but to find new sources of revenues to develop the Second Channel and eventually create a
third one. He also argues that the introduction of advertising on television will “revitalize the
production by giving to our firms the possibility to develop their domestic market, essential
support to any exporter activity.” (address in Parliament on April 24 1968).15
4.2 A threat to newspapers?
Left-leaning political parties and the Newspaper Industry were firmly against the reform.
The Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left (“Fe´de´ration de la gauche de´mocrate et
socialiste”) – a conglomerate of French left-wing non-Communist forces – introduced various
bills to ban commercial advertising on television by arguing that it would lead to a decrease in
the quality of television content. More importantly – and consistently with the identification
14Beginning on October 1st 1967, the Second Channel broadcasts twelve hours a week of programs in color.
15Commercial advertising is allowed much earlier in almost all other developed countries: it is allowed in
1941 in the US, in 1955 in the UK, in 1956 in Germany, and in 1957 in Italy and Spain (Parasie, 2010).
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strategy we use in this paper –, very much present is the idea that the reform would lead
to a decrease in newspaper advertising revenue.16 In fact, already in 1964, the Minister
of Information of the time, Alain Peyrefitte, was aware of this issue and claimed that the
introduction of advertising on television would be worth considering only if the press could
survive it (Bellanger, 1969).
Newspapers were similarly against the reform as they anticipate a decrease in their ad-
vertising revenues. And indeed, as underlined by Bellanger (1969), “in terms of national
advertising (...) in a limited market, any drain leads to a decrease in the advertising revenues
which the press lives off”. The Federation and the Confederation of the French Press esti-
mated in a report that the press would lose between 40 and 50% of its advertising revenues,
i.e., between 20 and 40% of total revenues depending on the newspaper.
4.3 A substitution effect
Despite these strong resistances from the newspaper industry and the opposition, the first
commercial advertisement is broadcasted on French Television in October 1968. The time
devoted to advertising is of 2 minutes per day in 1968 – only on the First Channel –, 4
in 1969, 8 in 1970 (i.e. 2,720 minutes per year) – year in which advertising is introduced
on the Second Channel, and more than 12 in 1971 (Bellanger, 1969). Advertising revenues
generated by the ORTF increase by 69 million francs (77 (constant 2009) million euros17)
between 1967 and 1968 and by 197 million francs (e201 million) between 1968 and 1969. In
1971, advertising revenues represent 22% of the ORTF total revenues (Bellanger, 1969). Did
this increase lead to a symmetric decrease in newspaper advertising revenues?
In order to provide a sense of the effect of the introduction of advertisement on television
on the advertising revenues of local and national daily newspapers, we first provide aggregate
evidence at the industry level.18 Total advertising revenues of national daily newspapers
decrease by 21 million francs (e45 million) between 1967 and 1968, and then stabilize around
500 million francs. While the advertising market is expanding in France between 1967 and
1974, national newspapers advertising revenues are actually decreasing. On the contrary, local
newspaper advertising revenues increase during the same period (Figure 3).
The introduction of advertisement on television in 1968 can thus be considered as a sig-
16The Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left argues that the government wishes to introduce
advertising on television so as to weaken newspapers, the only independent media (Parasie, 2010). In an
address to the Parliament on April 24 1968, Jacques Chambaz (from the Communist Party) claims that “the
introduction of commercial advertisement on television is but a new way to deal a blow to the broadsheet
newspapers that you consider not docile and flexible enough.”
17In the remainder of the paper, to save on space, we simply use the terminology “euros” when refering to
“constant 2009 euros”.
18In Section 5, we provide econometric evidence of this shock, computing differences-in-differences estimates
to show that this shock affects negatively the advertising revenues of the national daily newspapers, but not
those of the local daily newspapers.
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Figure 3: Advertising Revenues, 1967-1974, by Media Outlets
nificant negative shock on the advertisers’ side of the national newspaper industry. Why did
it only affect national newspapers? Because the nature of advertising varies between national
and local newspapers. In particular, advertisements in national newspapers are mostly com-
mercial advertisements that are relatively close substitutes to those broadcasted on television,
while a large share of advertisements in local newspapers are local in nature (local commercial
advertisements and classified advertisements).
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Estimation Strategy
We use our panel data to compute differences-in-differences (DD) estimates of the effect of
the introduction of advertising on television. The negative shock on newspaper advertising
revenues following this introduction (our treament) only affects national newspapers (treated
group) but not local newspapers (control group). We thus compare the pre-1968-to-post-1968
change in prices of national daily newspapers to the change in prices of local daily newspapers
over the same period.
Let Dnational news be an indicator variable for national newspapers and Dafter be a time
dummy that switches on for observations post 1968 (i.e., after the introduction of advertise-
ment on television). Our analysis is based on the following regression equation:
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log price ration,t =α+ β1Dafter + β2Dnational news + β3 (Dafter ∗Dnational news)
+X ′n,tδ + λn + γt + n,t
(20)
where n indexes newspapers and t indexes years (t = 1960, ...1974). λn is a newspaper
fixed effect, γt is a year fixed effect, and n,t is a newspaper-year shock. X
′
n,t is a vector
of newspaper-level controls; it includes circulation and operating costs. Standard errors are
clustered at the newspaper level.
The dependent variable, log price ration,t, is the log of the price ratio of newspaper n
in year t defined as the subscription price per issue divided by the unit price. We assume
that the difference in prices charged to unit buyers and subscribers is entirely due to price
discrimination and use the price ratio as our measure of price discrimination (Clerides, 2004).
Obviously, part of the difference between the prices charged to unit buyers and subscribers
may be driven by differences in costs, in particular costs of delivery. However, our assumption
is valid in the DD setting as long as the introduction of advertisement on television did not
affect costs of delivery.19
Due to the inclusion of newspapers and year fixed effects, the coefficient β3 – our coefficient
of interest – measures the annual price ratio effect for national newspapers of the introduction
of advertisement on television compared to the general evolution of the price ratio for local
newspapers. The key identifying assumption here is that price trends would be the same for
both categories of newspapers (local and national) in the absence of treatment. The treatment
induces a deviation from this common trend. Figure 4 provides strong visual evidence of
treatment and control newspapers with a common underlying trend, and a treatment effect
that induces a sharp deviation from this trend. However, as an alternative check on the DD
identification strategy, we add an industry-specific time trend to the list of controls. In other
words we estimate:
log pricen,t =α+ β1Dafter + β2Dnational news + β3 (Dafter ∗Dnational news)
+µ1nationalt+X
′
n,tδ + λn + γt + n,t
(21)
where µ1national is a national newspapers industry-specific trend coefficient multiplying the
time trend variable t. The introduction of these industry-specific time trends allows treatment
and control newspapers to follow different trends in a limited but potentially revealing way.
Finally, the unbiasedness of the DD estimates requires the strict exogeneity of the introduc-
tion of advertisement on television. As we underline above, French Television is state-owned
from 1945 to 1981. There is thus no interaction between television owners and newspaper
19Future work will aim at isolating the part of the difference in prices which reflects differences in costs
(non-discriminatory price differences) using relevant observed cost shifters (delivery costs are unobserved).
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Figure 4: Descriptive Evidence: Changes in Price Discrimination.
owners, be they national or local. The introduction of advertising on television was decided
unilaterally by the French government to answer the concerns of the ORTF. It is exogenous
to the newspaper industry.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Benchmark Estimates
Table 2 reports estimates of equations (20) and (21). It appears clearly in column 1 (baseline
estimation without controls and time trends) that there is a statistically significant decrease
in the price ratio – our measure of price discrimination – of national newspapers compared
to local newspapers following the introduction of advertisement on television. Moreover, this
negative effect is robust to controlling for a national newspapers industry-specific time trend
which is reassuring as to the validity of our DD identification strategy (column 2). This result
is also robust to the introduction of newspaper-level controls (column 3).
5.2.2 Timing of the Effect
This before-after event study approach enables us to control for time-invariant newspaper-
specific effects and general time trends. As an additional robustness check, we allow for flexible
time-varying effects of the negative shock on advertising revenues (Laporte and Windmeijer,
2005). To quantify the dynamics effects of the event and control for lags and leads, we define
(“pulse”) variables for two, non-overlapping, three-years spaced periods around the event
and a dummy variable isolating the long-run effect of the shock (see e.g. (Papaioannou and
Siourounis, 2008)).
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Table 2: The Effect of the Decrease in Advertising Revenues on the Price Ratio: Baseline
Estimation
Price Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
National x Post-1968 -0.12∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
News FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Specific Trend No Yes Yes
News Controls No No Yes
R-sq 0.14 0.14 0.20
Observations 968 968 955
Clusters (news) 71 71 71
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by newspaper. Time
period is 1960-74. Models are estimated using OLS estimations. Newspaper controls are newspaper circulation
and expenditures. Variables are described in more details in the text.
Our specification is:
log price ration,t =α+ δ1d
1
n,t + δ2d
2
n,t + δ3d
3
n,t
+X ′n,t∆ + λn + γt + n,t
(22)
where d1n,t = 1 in 1966, 1967 and 1968 for national newspapers (pre introduction of advertising
on television); d2n,t = 1 in 1969, 1970 and 1971 for national newspapers (at the time of the
introduction and in the following years); and d3n,t = 1 in 1972 and all subsequent post-
introduction years (until 1974). Each indicator variable equals zero in all other years than
those specified and for local newspapers. Thus the base period is the years before 1966.
Table 3 presents the results. In column 1 we report the results without controls, and in
column 2 we introduce newspaper-level controls. We find no statistically significant effect
(with a point estimate close to zero) for the pulse variable d1n,t = 1. This is reassuring as to
the validity of our DD strategy. Moreover, as expected given the results of Table 2, we obtain
a negative and statistically significant at the 1% level δ2: there is a statistically significant
decrease in the price ratio – i.e., in the extent of price discrimination – of national newspapers
compared to local newspapers following the introduction of advertising on television. This
effect is long lasting: the δ3 is statistically significant and the point estimates is higher than
for the short-run effect (column 1) and increases when we introduce controls (column 2).
Finally in Table 4, we investigate the effect of the introduction of advertising, using the
same empirical strategy, separately for unit prices and subscription prices. It appears that
the decrease in the price ratio is entirely driven by a decrease in the subscription price,
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Table 3: The Effect of the Decrease in Advertising Revenues on the Price Ratio: Timing of
the Effect
Price Ratio
(1) (2)
Pre Introduction of Advertisement on TV
(1966-1968) -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
Short-Run Introduction of Advertisement on TV
(1969-1971) -0.12∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02)
Long-Run Introduction of Advertisement on TV
(1972, onwards) -0.13∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Year FE Yes Yes
News FE Yes Yes
News Controls No Yes
R-sq 0.14 0.19
Observations 968 955
Clusters (news) 71 71
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by newspaper. Time
period is 1960-74. Models are estimated using OLS estimations. Newspaper controls are newspaper circulation
and expenditures. Variables are described in more details in the text.
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Table 4: The Effect of the Decrease in Advertising Revenues on Different Prices: Timing of
the Effect
Unit Price Subscription Price Advertising Price
(1) (2) (3)
Pre Introduction of Advertisement on TV
(1966-1968) -0.02 -0.04 -0.17
(0.03) (0.03) (0.22)
Short-Run Introduction of Advertisement on TV
(1969-1971) 0.02 -0.10∗∗∗ -0.52∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.23)
Long-Run Introduction of Advertisement on TV
(1972, onwards) -0.01 -0.15∗∗∗ -0.58∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.26)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
News FE Yes Yes Yes
News Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-sq 0.93 0.90 0.21
Observations 955 955 590
Clusters (news) 71 71 48
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by newspaper. Time
period is 1960-74. Models are estimated using OLS estimations. Newspaper controls are newspaper circulation
and expenditures. Variables are described in more details in the text.
while there is no statistically significant change in the unit price charged to unit buyers at
the newsstand. Moreover, we find a statistically significant decrease in the advertising price
charged by national newspapers compared to local newspapers following the introduction of
advertising on television. This effect is long lasting: the δ3 is statistically significant and the
point estimates is higher than for the short-run effect when advertising price is the outcome
variable of interest.
6 Conclusion
We have built a model in which a profit-maximizing newspaper must attract both readers
and advertisers. Particular attention has been paid to the incentives the newspaper has to
engage in second-degree price discrimination between subscribers and occasional buyers, and
how these incentives interact with the advertisers’ side of the industry, and in particular the
reliance on advertising revenues.
In our model, there is scope for second degree price-discrimination because of the readers’
uncertainty regarding their utility from reading in future periods. The newspaper sets its
prices such that readers with a high average taste for reading subscribe at a relatively low
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unit cost, while readers with an intermediate average taste for reading only buy occasionally
– but at a high price – when their utility from reading on that day is high. One general
tendency that emerges is that, as long as advertisers prefer large readerships to smaller one,
prices charged to readers tend to be lower than absent the advertisers’ side of the industry.
Following a general increase in the outside option of newspapers we therefore find that prices
tend to go up. As for the extent of price discrimination, the interaction with the advertisers’
side is more subtle since then elasticities, group sizes, as well as the average taste of marginal
advertisers (those indifferent between placing an ad or not) are all relevant. According to the
empirical evidence we obtain using French daily newspapers between 1960 and 1974, price
discrimination increases when advertising revenues decline.
This empirical finding has implications for the 21st century newspaper industry. In partic-
ular it sheds light on the observed current tendency for newspapers to favor subscriber-based
readerships through low subscription prices (and high newsstand prices). What our paper
suggests is that when newspapers are less capable of generating revenues from advertising, all
else equal, they tend to adjust their pricing policies on the readers’ side so as to increase the
share of subscribers. As advertising revenues continue declining, we should thus expect this
tendency to reinforce itself in the coming years.
Moreover, our results also shed light on a new phenomenon characterizing the newspaper
industry: the tendency of a number of newspapers in the United States to charge more for a
digital subscription than for a print subscription, despite that it is much more costly to deliver
a print than a digital subscription. The Greensboro News & Record is thereby charging $187.12
for a 7-day, 52-week print subscription but $215.40 for a digital one. Similarly, the Orange
County Register is offering digital access for $3.99 a week, or digital plus Sunday print for
$2.99 a week, and the New York Times’ Sunday print gives all-digital access at a price thats
usually cheaper than all-digital access itself.20 What is driving this new pricing strategy?
According to our results, this could be explained by the fact that a digital reader may be
worth less than a print reader (see e.g. Noam, 2009)21. To the extent that newspapers may be
less capable of generating advertising revenues from a digital-only subscription than from a
print one, they may tend to adjust their pricing policies to increase the share of print readers.
Whether it is indeed the case will be the topic of future research.
20http://www.niemanlab.org/2014/07/when-a-digital-subscription-costs-more-than-a-print-one/
21“A print reader generates more than 20 times times as much in revenues than an online reader.” (p.440)
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